

65-7685

22 June 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

**The Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs**

1. Director Raborn will have in Peter Jessup's hands tomorrow copies of the cables on which the attached memo is based.

2. He believes that you will find these cables of interest and may wish to show them up the line.

3. The Director wishes to remind you that this survey was undertaken in response to a specific request.

[Redacted Signature]

**Executive Assistant**

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WE:blp

Original - Addressee w/attachment (handcarried)

1 - WE Chrono w/o att

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*McGeorge Bundy*

**SECRET**

22 June 1965

**SUBJECT: Estimate of Attitudes of News Media and General Population in Certain Countries, to U.S. Policies as Exemplified by our Actions in Vietnam and [redacted]**

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1. This is a narrative tabulation of the general thrust of the responses received from our field stations to the question posed:

a. In [redacted] and the

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[redacted] our policies, particularly on Vietnam, receive general understanding and support. Our policies on [redacted] are clearly of less interest and concern. The minority opposition to our policies, where it exists in these countries, takes full advantage of our domestic opposition as it finds expression in our own news media. (This factor is prevalent generally, in varying degrees, in the countries we queried.)

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b. In [redacted] reactions to our policies are mixed and confused.

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(1) In [redacted] divided opinion among the population and the major newspapers, which favored U.S. policies slightly a few months ago, has shifted to a more pronounced attitude of questioning and disfavor as a result of the bombings of North Vietnam and the possibility of [redacted] in a disagreeable conflict of doubtful outcome. Here again, interest is high on the Vietnamese situation and on a low order of magnitude and declining on the [redacted] question.

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(2) In [redacted] which is generally sympathetic to the U.S. objectives, there is opposition to our policies both in the press and among the people, caused mostly by concern over the broader possible consequences of escalation, with particular reference to the fact that [redacted]

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(3) In [ ] while our policies in Vietnam on the whole receive general support, and are understood, our position in [ ] is not adequately understood and is therefore criticized.

(4) In [ ] although there is much ambivalence of attitude and vocal criticism, the estimate is that strong moves in Vietnam or Latin America would ultimately be viewed rationally by the [ ] and receive their political support.

c. In [ ] the press and the public generally are unsympathetic or not strongly critical of our policies, and in [ ] a measure of public support of our firm stand in Vietnam is being eroded by [ ] anti-U. S. position and press criticisms of our policies in both Vietnam and the [ ]

d. In [ ] very little interest is shown in either Vietnam or [ ] The local government papers are generally sympathetic to the U. S. policy and difficulties, and the Communist press highly critical.

2. On a world-wide basis, we can draw the following generalizations from the field responses:

a. In many sectors of the populations there is a basic apathy toward both Vietnam and the [ ] except as various forms of local self-interest are affected, in terms of local elections, present commitments in the areas concerned, or national survival. The situation in Vietnam is far better understood and the issues more clear, although there is doubt about the future. There is some frustration over the fact that modern technology has not prevailed in a jungle war. The most prevalent fear is that the bombings of North Vietnam could lead to further escalation and perhaps a general war.

b. On the other hand, the [ ] questions are in many instances too remote to stimulate any real concern, or are considered to be localized. The rationale behind the U. S. action is often misunderstood, and our "intervention" regretted or vilified.

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c. Where there is strong opposition to U.S. policies, it is often lead by the left-wing media and organized leftist or Communist front groups. ( ) is an exception, where their role is secondary.) A disproportionate advantage is taken of U.S. news media and news services coverage of domestic U.S. dissent to the Administration's policies.

3. The tenor of the stations' contributions suggests that in all our policy statements, news releases, and guidances to receptive journalists and editors, the U.S. must project the image of a nation mindful of and willing to exercise its responsibilities as a Free World leader. The U.S. must show that we are ready to take positive initiatives -- unilaterally or in concert with other nations as time and circumstances permit -- to expose the true character of Communism, to oppose Communist subversion and aggrandizement in any form, and to employ force judiciously when the Communist side proves unreceptive to negotiation and consultation and persists in its subversive efforts. The U.S. needs frequently to reiterate its objectives and to express them in terms understandable and acceptable to the man in the street here and abroad. The U.S. must avoid giving the impression that it is we who are afraid of the Communist bogeyman; we must make clear the implications of Communism and our objectives to each country or region. Above all, it is imperative that the other nations of the Free World understand our policies, and retain full confidence in our interests and capabilities.